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All the ideas for 'works', 'Set Theory and Its Philosophy' and 'Problems of Philosophy'

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126 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
There is practical wisdom (for action), and theoretical wisdom (for deep understanding) [Aristotle, by Whitcomb]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Philosophers must get used to absurdities [Russell]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Philosophy verifies that our hierarchy of instinctive beliefs is harmonious and consistent [Russell]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
Metaphysics cannot give knowledge of the universe as a whole [Russell]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
Philosophy is similar to science, and has no special source of wisdom [Russell]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
For Aristotle logos is essentially the ability to talk rationally about questions of value [Roochnik on Aristotle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Aristotle is the supreme optimist about the ability of logos to explain nature [Roochnik on Aristotle]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 1. Laws of Thought
The law of contradiction is not a 'law of thought', but a belief about things [Russell]
Three Laws of Thought: identity, contradiction, and excluded middle [Russell]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
Aristotelian definitions aim to give the essential properties of the thing defined [Aristotle, by Quine]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
Aristotelian definition involves first stating the genus, then the differentia of the thing [Aristotle, by Urmson]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
Truth is a property of a belief, but dependent on its external relations, not its internal qualities [Russell]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Truth and falsehood are properties of beliefs and statements [Russell]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 7. Falsehood
A good theory of truth must make falsehood possible [Russell]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Truth as congruence may work for complex beliefs, but not for simple beliefs about existence [Joslin on Russell]
Beliefs are true if they have corresponding facts, and false if they don't [Russell]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
The coherence theory says falsehood is failure to cohere, and truth is fitting into a complete system of Truth [Russell]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 2. Coherence Truth Critique
More than one coherent body of beliefs seems possible [Russell]
If we suspend the law of contradiction, nothing will appear to be incoherent [Russell]
Coherence is not the meaning of truth, but an important test for truth [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
The mortality of Socrates is more certain from induction than it is from deduction [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Set theory's three roles: taming the infinite, subject-matter of mathematics, and modes of reasoning [Potter]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
Usually the only reason given for accepting the empty set is convenience [Potter]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / f. Axiom of Infinity V
Infinity: There is at least one limit level [Potter]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
Nowadays we derive our conception of collections from the dependence between them [Potter]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / f. Limitation of Size
The 'limitation of size' principles say whether properties collectivise depends on the number of objects [Potter]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Aristotle relativises the notion of wholeness to different measures [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
Mereology elides the distinction between the cards in a pack and the suits [Potter]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
We can formalize second-order formation rules, but not inference rules [Potter]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 5. Modus Ponens
Demonstration always relies on the rule that anything implied by a truth is true [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
For Aristotle, the subject-predicate structure of Greek reflected a substance-accident structure of reality [Aristotle, by O'Grady]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Proper names are really descriptions, and can be replaced by a description in a person's mind [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
The phrase 'a so-and-so' is an 'ambiguous' description'; 'the so-and-so' (singular) is a 'definite' description [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 3. Proof from Assumptions
Supposing axioms (rather than accepting them) give truths, but they are conditional [Potter]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
If set theory didn't found mathematics, it is still needed to count infinite sets [Potter]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
It is remarkable that all natural number arithmetic derives from just the Peano Axioms [Potter]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
Maths is not known by induction, because further instances are not needed to support it [Russell]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Space is neutral between touch and sight, so it cannot really be either of them [Russell]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / c. Facts and truths
In a world of mere matter there might be 'facts', but no truths [Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
Because we depend on correspondence, we know relations better than we know the items that relate [Russell]
That Edinburgh is north of London is a non-mental fact, so relations are independent universals [Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
A relation is a set consisting entirely of ordered pairs [Potter]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Every complete sentence must contain at least one word (a verb) which stands for a universal [Russell]
Propositions express relations (prepositions and verbs) as well as properties (nouns and adjectives) [Russell]
Confused views of reality result from thinking that only nouns and adjectives represent universals [Russell]
All universals are like the relation "is north of", in having no physical location at all [Russell, by Loux]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
Russell claims that universals are needed to explain a priori knowledge (as their relations) [Russell, by Mellor/Oliver]
Every sentence contains at least one word denoting a universal, so we need universals to know truth [Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
Normal existence is in time, so we must say that universals 'subsist' [Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 5. Universals as Concepts
If we identify whiteness with a thought, we can never think of it twice; whiteness is the object of a thought [Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
'Resemblance Nominalism' won't work, because the theory treats resemblance itself as a universal [Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 4. Concept Nominalism
If we consider whiteness to be merely a mental 'idea', we rob it of its universality [Russell]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / b. Need for substance
If dependence is well-founded, with no infinite backward chains, this implies substances [Potter]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
The unmoved mover and the soul show Aristotelian form as the ultimate mereological atom [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
The 'form' is the recipe for building wholes of a particular kind [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
Collections have fixed members, but fusions can be carved in innumerable ways [Potter]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 1. Types of Modality
Priority is a modality, arising from collections and members [Potter]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
In any possible world we feel that two and two would be four [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
For Aristotle, knowledge is of causes, and is theoretical, practical or productive [Aristotle, by Code]
Knowledge cannot be precisely defined, as it merges into 'probable opinion' [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
Belief relates a mind to several things other than itself [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
We have an 'instinctive' belief in the external world, prior to all reflection [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
Descartes showed that subjective things are the most certain [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
'Acquaintance' is direct awareness, without inferences or judgements [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / c. Representative realism
Russell (1912) said phenomena only resemble reality in abstract structure [Russell, by Robinson,H]
There is no reason to think that objects have colours [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
'Idealism' says that everything which exists is in some sense mental [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 4. Solipsism
It is not illogical to think that only myself and my mental events exist [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
The notion of a priori truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
Some propositions are self-evident, but their implications may also be self-evident [Russell]
Particular instances are more clearly self-evident than any general principles [Russell]
As shown by memory, self-evidence comes in degrees [Russell]
If self-evidence has degrees, we should accept the more self-evident as correct [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
The rationalists were right, because we know logical principles without experience [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
All a priori knowledge deals with the relations of universals [Russell]
We can know some general propositions by universals, when no instance can be given [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
Russell's representationalism says primary qualities only show the structure of reality [Russell, by Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
After 1912, Russell said sense-data are last in analysis, not first in experience [Russell, by Grayling]
'Sense-data' are what are immediately known in sensation, such as colours or roughnesses [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Aristotle is a rationalist, but reason is slowly acquired through perception and experience [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
If Russell rejects innate ideas and direct a priori knowledge, he is left with a tabula rasa [Russell, by Thompson]
It is natural to begin from experience, and presumably that is the basis of knowledge [Russell]
We are acquainted with outer and inner sensation, memory, Self, and universals [Russell, by PG]
Knowledge by descriptions enables us to transcend private experience [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
I can know the existence of something with which nobody is acquainted [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Aristotle wants to fit common intuitions, and therefore uses language as a guide [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
Images are not memory, because they are present, and memories are of the past [Russell]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
A true belief is not knowledge if it is reached by bad reasoning [Russell]
True belief is not knowledge when it is deduced from false belief [Russell]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
All knowledge (of things and of truths) rests on the foundations of acquaintance [Russell]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 5. Dream Scepticism
Dreams can be explained fairly scientifically if we assume a physical world [Russell]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Plato says sciences are unified around Forms; Aristotle says they're unified around substance [Aristotle, by Moravcsik]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
Science aims to find uniformities to which (within the limits of experience) there are no exceptions [Russell]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
Chickens are not very good at induction, and are surprised when their feeder wrings their neck [Russell]
We can't prove induction from experience without begging the question [Russell]
It doesn't follow that because the future has always resembled the past, that it always will [Russell]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
Aristotelian explanations are facts, while modern explanations depend on human conceptions [Aristotle, by Politis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Aristotle's standard analysis of species and genus involves specifying things in terms of something more general [Aristotle, by Benardete,JA]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
Aristotle regularly says that essential properties explain other significant properties [Aristotle, by Kung]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
If the cat reappears in a new position, presumably it has passed through the intermediate positions [Russell]
Belief in real objects makes our account of experience simpler and more systematic [Russell]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
It is hard not to believe that speaking humans are expressing thoughts, just as we do ourselves [Russell]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy
If we didn't know our own minds by introspection, we couldn't know that other people have minds [Russell]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance
I learn the universal 'resemblance' by seeing two shades of green, and their contrast with red [Russell]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
In seeing the sun, we are acquainted with our self, but not as a permanent person [Russell]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
In perceiving the sun, I am aware of sun sense-data, and of the perceiver of the data [Russell]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
It is rational to believe in reality, despite the lack of demonstrative reasons for it [Russell]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / c. Animal rationality
Aristotle and the Stoics denied rationality to animals, while Platonists affirmed it [Aristotle, by Sorabji]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
Knowledge of truths applies to judgements; knowledge by acquaintance applies to sensations and things [Russell]
Russell's 'multiple relations' theory says beliefs attach to ingredients, not to propositions [Russell, by Linsky,B]
Truth is when a mental state corresponds to a complex unity of external constituents [Russell]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / b. Error
In order to explain falsehood, a belief must involve several terms, not two [Russell]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
A universal of which we are aware is called a 'concept' [Russell]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Russell started philosophy of language, by declaring some plausible sentences to be meaningless [Russell, by Hart,WD]
Every understood proposition is composed of constituents with which we are acquainted [Russell]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
It is pure chance which descriptions in a person's mind make a name apply to an individual [Russell]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
The main aim of the multiple relations theory of judgement was to dispense with propositions [Russell, by Linsky,B]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
The notion of analytic truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal [Aristotle, by Fogelin]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 2. Ideal of Pleasure
Judgements of usefulness depend on judgements of value [Russell]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain an idea without accepting it [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Aristotle said the educated were superior to the uneducated as the living are to the dead [Aristotle, by Diog. Laertius]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
There are potential infinities (never running out), but actual infinity is incoherent [Aristotle, by Friend]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / a. Greek matter
Aristotle's matter can become any other kind of matter [Aristotle, by Wiggins]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
We can't know that our laws are exceptionless, or even that there are any laws [Russell]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 2. Greek Polytheism
The concepts of gods arose from observing the soul, and the cosmos [Aristotle, by Sext.Empiricus]